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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
How the Federal Reserve Should Help 
States and Localities Right Now
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
The COVID-19 pandemic is a giant 
catastrophe, but the Federal Reserve can still 
mitigate the looming fiscal crises facing state 
and local governments. This article — a 
contribution to Project SAFE (State Action in 
Fiscal Emergencies) — builds on our prior 
background essay explaining state and local 
budget issues.1
In the American system of federalism, states 
and localities are at the forefront of providing 
basic government services, but without the 
monetary or financial powers of the central 
government. This has worked well enough in 
ordinary times, and in most national 
emergencies the federal government has taken 
the lead. But states and localities are in the lead 
in this national emergency, and they need the 
federal government’s financial support. The 
reason is simple: States are governed by 
balanced budget rules, but the federal 
government is not.2 There are good reasons for 
this difference, but it means that the federal 
government must step up in times of crisis.
And the federal government has started to 
act. For instance, $150 billion in section 601 of the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act has been allocated to states and 
localities for “necessary expenditures” in 
connection with COVID-19. And section 4003(b) 
of the CARES Act provides up to $434 billion in 
loans to states, local governments, and private 
businesses. The Fed has used $35 billion of this 
$434 billion as an equity contribution to launch a 
$500 billion lending program for the states and 
larger localities.3 This number is appropriate, as 
the National Governors Association has 
estimated that states will need $500 billion.4
Yet those steps are insufficient. Even if $150 
billion is the exact amount as to how much states 
and localities will pay in necessary COVID-19 
expenditures, that will not cover the precipitous 
budget shortfalls caused by shutting down large 
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors show how the Federal 
Reserve could support state and local 
governments during the COVID-19 emergency 
to prevent drastic spending cuts.
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Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in 
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.
2
David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the 
Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749, 754-68 (2010).
3
U.S. Federal Reserve Board, “Municipal Liquidity Facility” (Apr. 27, 
2020).
4
National Governors Association, “National Governors Association 
Outlines Need for ‘Additional and Immediate’ Fiscal Assistance to 
States,” Apr. 11, 2020.
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parts of the economy, which is estimated to 
result in a shortfall of $500 billion or even more.5
The Fed has offered to purchase $500 billion in 
notes, but they have a three-year limit.6 What 
happens then? Also, the current program expires 
on December 31, 2020.7 What happens when states 
and localities realize that their deficits will 
continue to grow?
There are even more problems to consider. 
How does the Fed’s short-term lending program 
help an airport bond issue that falls behind on its 
payments or a mass transit agency wishing to 
issue new bonds for a desperately needed project 
(that would also create jobs)?
We will address how the Federal Reserve can 
assist the municipal bond market in a future essay. 
But here, we will focus on the more immediate 
need of helping state and local governments avoid 
being forced to make drastic spending cuts.
The best answer is for Congress to provide 
much greater support for the states and localities 
in general. There are many ways this could 
happen, including direct grants8 or increased 
federal support for unemployment insurance.9 
Unfortunately, Congress seems unlikely to act 
either quickly or sufficiently. But that isn’t 
necessarily the end of the story. Another actor, the 
Federal Reserve, can and should step in to save 
the day.
I. What the Federal Reserve Can Do
As noted, the Federal Reserve will lend $500 
billion to states and localities in the form of short-
term (up to three-year) notes. But the problem 
here is that three years is just too short of a time 
frame; the states will need to be able to pay back 
these loans over a much longer term if they are to 
meaningfully help in preventing dramatic, 
harmful budget cuts. Therefore, the core of our 
proposal is that the loans (or notes purchased) be 
extended for a longer term and at a reasonably 
low rate — say a 20-year term at the federal 
government’s cost of funds, which was 1.02 
percent on April 29.10
Note that prominent economists11 such as Ben 
Bernanke12 have endorsed using monetary policy 
to shore up demand under extreme 
circumstances. In the case we are making, the 
Federal Reserve would not be creating new 
demand in the economy so much as preventing its 
needless destruction.
II. Does It Have the Legal Authority to 
Make Those Loans?
We should acknowledge that our expertise is 
in tax law and public finance, not banking law or 
the powers of the Federal Reserve. Nevertheless, 
with that caveat, our understanding is that the 
Federal Reserve does have the power to make 
those loans, but with two complications.
First, to offer the current short-term lending 
facility, the Federal Reserve acted under the 
authority of section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act.13 There is nothing in section 13 that dictates 
that the loans must be short term. However, 
section 13 was revised by the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to 
require more transparency and accountability. Of 
particular importance, the Federal Reserve “may 
not establish any program or facility under this 
paragraph without the prior approval of the 
5
Michael Leachman, “New CBO Projections Suggest Even Bigger 
State Shortfalls,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Apr. 29, 2020. 
(Noting prior estimates “that states would face $500 billion in state 
shortfalls in fiscal years 2020 through 2022,” and then revised estimates 
of “shortfalls totaling $650 billion, substantially deeper than during the 
Great Recession,” and emphasizing that these revised estimates are “for 
state budget shortfalls only; it does not reflect the additional shortfalls 
that local governments, territories, and tribes face. Federal aid provided 
to date will help cover some of these shortfalls but it is not nearly 
enough. Only about $65 billion of the aid provided in earlier COVID-19 
packages is readily available to narrow these shortfalls. Using that aid 
and the $75 billion that states have in rainy day funds would leave states 
with about $510 billion in unaddressed shortfalls.”)
6
The Fed increased the limit from two years to three, which we take 
to be a hopeful sign. U.S. Federal Reserve Board, “Federal Reserve Board 
Announces an Expansion of the Scope and Duration of the Municipal 




Daniel Hemel, Ruth Mason, and Gladriel Shobe, “What the States 
Need From Congress Now Is Cold, Hard Cash,” Time, Apr. 14, 2020.
9
Brian Galle et al., “States Should Quickly Reform Unemployment 
Insurance,” Tax Notes State, May 4, 2020, p. 635.
10
U.S. Treasury Department, “Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates.”
11
Adair Turner, “The Case for Monetary Finance — An Essentially 
Political Issue,” IMF Jacques Polak Research Conference (Nov. 5, 2015).
12
Ben S. Bernanke, “What Tools Does the Fed Have Left? Part 3: 
Helicopter Money,” Brookings Institution, Apr. 16, 2016.
13
Codified at 12 U.S.C. section 343(3); “Municipal Liquidity Facility,” 
supra note 3.
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Secretary of the Treasury.”14 Accordingly, the 
current short-term program was approved by the 
secretary of the Treasury.15
Thus, for the reasons outlined earlier, the 
Treasury secretary may promptly approve a 
longer-term lending program. But what if he fails 
to do so? Could the Federal Reserve still act on its 
own?
We believe the Federal Reserve could use its 
powers under section 14 of the Federal Reserve 
Act even without the express approval of the 
Treasury secretary16 — because the Federal 
Reserve’s power under section 14 does not require 
approval from the secretary. There is, however, a 
significant limitation: Under section 14, the notes 
cannot have longer than a six-month maturity.
But how much of a limitation is this really? 
Could the Federal Reserve just commit to 
permitting states the option to roll over their debts 
during the crisis and for a fixed, but significant 
period thereafter (again, say 20 years)? Once the 
crisis was over, states could only roll over a 
decreasing amount of principal each period. The 
steadily declining amount of the reduction could 
function as a kind of amortization schedule.
The Federal Reserve could even have upfront 
rules as to the amount of debt it would be willing 
to purchase from a state or locality based on the 
size of the projected deficits compared with a 
recent historical baseline. That seems a reasonable 
safeguard, as a matter of both politics and fiscal 
federalism. After all, this program should not be 
about bailing out underfunded pension 
programs.17
Federal tax law already has a model for what 
this calculation might look like.18 That is because 
states and localities regularly borrow for cash 
flow purposes, but if they were to borrow too 
much, this would turn their borrowing into an 
arbitrage bond or would require rebate of the 
arbitrage. Accordingly, federal tax law delves into 
the definition of a cumulative cash flow deficit. 
These rules won’t necessarily translate perfectly to 
the context we discuss here, but they should at 
least provide a neutral baseline with which to 
begin.
III. Can the States Take the Money?
As noted, states face balanced budget 
constraints and may not be able to borrow from 
the Federal Reserve — at least not without a vote. 
In some states, voters can be asked to approve 
borrowing.19 But there are also well-worn 
exceptions to the debt limitation rules, which 
mean that states and localities could borrow from 
a Federal Reserve lending program even without 
a vote. One notable and widespread exception 
from the requirement for an election is for short-
term borrowing,20 so extending the states’ 
renewable short-term financing could work well 
for both the Federal Reserve and states.
Other exceptions might apply, such as the 
special fund exception,21 whereby the state must 
commit some special stream of revenue to pay off 
a debt rather than general taxes. Perhaps states 
and localities could pledge to use some part of 
revenue streams that are now very depressed, 
such as from hotel taxes, in order to secure needed 
loans now. Or, as we plan to elaborate in a future 
essay, states may wish to adopt a new, future 
revenue source (such as a wealth tax or mark-to-
market reform) to pay off current borrowing.
In sum, the Federal Reserve appears to have 
the legal authority needed to act to help states and 
localities, and the states and localities appear to 
have the authority to accept that help. The 
mechanics are somewhat convoluted, and making 
it all work will require planning. Thus, as cuts 
start being made across the country, the Federal 
Reserve must swiftly begin this process.
14
12 U.S.C. section 343(3)(B)(iv).
15
U.S. Federal Reserve Board, supra note 6.
16
12 U.S.C. section 355(1).
17
Mary Williams Walsh, “Illinois Seeks a Bailout From Congress for 




See, e.g., Cal. Const. Art. XVI, section 1. Apologies for the 
California-centric examples, but other states are broadly similar. See 
Richard Briffault, “Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal 
Limits and State Constitutional Law,” 34 Rutgers L.J. 907 (2002).
20
See, e.g., Riley v. Johnson, 219 Cal. 513 (1933); Riley v. Johnson (Riley v. 
Johnson II), 6 Cal. 2d 529 (1936).
21
See, e.g., California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott, 17 Cal. 3d 575 
(1976); California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593 
(1974).
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IV. Whither Federalism?
Would our proposal be proper on federalism 
grounds? Some have expressed concerns that the 
federal government should not bail out 
“profligate” states.22 However, we don’t think 
those concerns are well placed, for at least two 
reasons. First, these are meant to be emergency 
measures. It is clearly possible to design aid to 
state and local governments that helps them 
through the current crisis without bailing out past 
mistakes.
Second, and more fundamentally, the system 
of American federalism is far from operating as it 
should. It is entirely consistent with the theory of 
federalism that the federal government should 
step in and use its superior financial firepower 
during national economic downturns. It has 
always been a theoretical weakness of our system 
of federalism that states, which have balanced 
budget constraints, are also tasked with partially 
financing enormous procyclical expenses for 
Medicaid and unemployment insurance. The 
problems with this arrangement were clear 
enough during the Great Recession, but they are 
even more apparent now.
V. Conclusion
It is not too late for the Federal Reserve to act 
to head off debilitating state and local budget 
cuts. It acted boldly to rescue systemically 
important entities during the Great Recession. 
State and local government spending programs 
are at least as important during this pandemic, 
and the Federal Reserve should step in to save 
them. 
22
Andrew Desiderio, “McConnell Pushes ‘Bankruptcy Route’ as 
Local Governments Struggle,” Politico, Apr. 22, 2020.
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